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Of late, a
number of articles have appeared in the business press about independent
directors(IDs). With modern corporate governance laws and regulations insisting
on independent directors as the corner stone of better governance, a lot of
discussions and debates have also been happening on the role of IDs. Everybody
agrees that IDs are required for better corporate governance.But different
people define the roles differentlly –
some as strategic advisors to the
management & watchdog to protect the interest of the minority shareholders,some
say it is to oversee the financial and management performance, some others say
it is to hire and fire CEOs and plan for
succession in the management hierarchy. While these are all elements of good
corporate governance and also part of
the roles which IDs play, they play
these roles as any other members of the board, not specifically a IDs. In fact,
the board has a collective responsibility for all these including the IDs. Then
what is the primary role of IDs in a corporate entity? The word corporate
entity is very important in this context because that is why we need corporate
governance. Corporate bodies are created
as entities distinct and separate from promoters or management. Promoters, by and large, have a tendency to treat the
companies as their private properties, and will find it difficult to appreciate
it as a separate entity which has an
existence of its own, delineated from them. Whether it is Azim Premji with more that 80 percent of Wipro or
Mr.Sudhir Reddy with only 11.18% in IVRCL (Source: Annual reports
of Wipro and IVRCL for 2011-12) one has
to keep this in mind. The very concept of inducting Independent
Directors on to the boards of corporate entities must have been borne out of
the premise(or fact) that the promoter will find it extremely difficult to draw a line delineating his interest and the
company’s interests. The recent controversy at Jindal Steel & Power,
relating to the move to authorize the promoter Chairman & Managing Director
“to revise, from time to time, remuneration of Whole-time Directors of the
Company, by whatever designation they are called, by way of annual increments
or otherwise” (Annual Report,2011-12,JSPL) is the result of such treatment of
the company as an extension of the family. Had the promoters treated the
company as a separate entity, different from family, such a proposal would not
have arisen at all. Some of the world’s best known companies like General
Electric(GE) continues to be governed well even though the promoter lineage
doesn’t exist now, precisely because of this concept.
Dolphy D 'Souza in his recent article (Independent Directors:
More questions than answers, BL, Mays}, 2013) says that "It is a strange
irony that IDs appointed by promoters have to protect the interest of the
perceived adversaries of the promoters-the minority shareholders." While
in India, D' Souza's views on the appointment
part could be true, as a nomination committee, constituted only of IDs is not mandatory according to our
corporate governance regulations. But why the statement that minority
shareholders are adversaries of promoters and hence IDs have to protect their
interests. Why should minority shareholders' interests be different if the
corporate body is well managed & governed, in the larger interests of the
organization’s well being? Shareholders, whether promoters or others may have
interests which are different from the firm(the entity). Minority shareholders are usually a fleeting type who may not be
interested in anything other than their returns. But they don't object to any
decisions made by the majority shareholders (mostly promoters) who are usually
in management in India, if they feel confident that the decisions are good for
them too. But the shareholder emphasis in corporate governance is is not
necessarily right or even legitimate because the shareholders are not
permanent(including the promoters, who at times decide to exit or allow the
firm to be acquired by others or merged
with others primarily because it is good for them or the management and not
necessarily for the entity). This only
adds to my argument.
D' Souz also opines that “IDs argue that they do not have voting power and should not
be seen as a panacea for wrongdoings." This contention is wrong as IDs
mostly matter in a board meeting where if the majority of IDs oppose a decision
by the promoter directors or inside directors or management(executive as well
non-executive directors who are promoter nominees) and it is quite possible
that the promoters have to give adequate weightage for the opinions of the IDs,and
not in an AGM where shareholding matters. Also, one may not fully agree that IDs
can only resign from the boards “when his or her efforts to correct the wrongdoings are
unsuccessful ." The problems Iie in the fact that the IDs owe their
positions to the promoters and with the kind of remuneration they get today,
very rarely they object to the wrongdoings by the promoters.Resignation is not
the answer. They should have first objected in the board room, insisted that
their views be recorded in the minutes of the board meeting. If still promoters
don't budge, they should be willing to express their opinion in public.
Resignation will only weaken the institution IDs. Or if at all one resigns, why
doesn't he explain the reason for resignation to the public at large? This is
to be done in the interest of efforts towards better governance.Unless the IDs
exert the power vested with them, governance will not improve. At least there
has been one example where IDs as a
group put their foot down and objected
to the plans of management and a formidable majority shareholder like
Government(Coal India Ltd.) because the decision by the management (with tacit
blessing by the government). Of course,
at the other extreme, the IDs at Jindal Steel & Power seem to have done nothing against a move by
the promoter shareholders to authorize the CEO to fix the rumination to be paid
to whole-time directors including himself, letting down the very institution of
IDs. (The IDs didn't even have to protect their
'high' remunerations ' in this case: they are paid a pittance).
Off course, I do agree with D' Sousa that IDs have to rely
heavily on management for information
and it will be cruel to punish them just like promoters-directors or whole-time
directors on the premise of collective liability of the board. We should rather
wait for many more years and let the governance processes establish with objectivity
in the board rooms. Laws and regulations must be
suitably amended or created to protect the IDs if they acted diligently in the
interest of the corporate body.